


INTERNAL USE ONLY

OLC RECORD COPY

19 DEC 1978  
OLC 78-3625



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Federal Women's Program Board  
[REDACTED] Chairperson

*Security*

SUBJECT : Security Inspection Program (U)

STATINTL

1. Action Requested: That the Security Inspection Program be modified to eliminate its unfair application to women. (U)

2. Background: Since October 1978, Agency employees have been participating in an experimental 24 hours-a-day briefcase, purse, and package inspection program. The Federal Women's Board has received a number of complaints which the Board feels are serious enough to warrant your attention. The Board members spoke to Mr. Bob Gambino, Director of Security, on 14 November 1978, and he seemed surprised at the depth of negative feeling about the search expressed by the Board members. While we understand the rationale for searching only items that are carried, in practice the system is unfair to women who consistently carry one or more items. This inherent unfairness is evidenced by the lines of women waiting to be searched at each building exit at COB daily while the majority of men depart without questioning. Mr. Gambino promised to look into the uneven application of the search. (U/IUO)

3. We would like to emphasize that we support the need for the program, but we also recognize that its success depends largely upon the cooperation of Agency employees. (U/IUO)

4. We feel that as representatives of the women of CIA, we have a responsibility to bring to your attention matters that are of importance and concern to some of the women employees. According to the complaints received by Board members, many women feel that the inspection program is fundamentally unfair. They contend that their purses are not merely containers but private and personal items of clothing that all women must have for their money, keys, etc. Because women view their purses as extensions of their persons, they consider the purse search a grave--and sometimes embarrassing--invasion of their privacy, in much the same way a man would view a search of his coat and pants pockets. (U/IUO)

INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

5. A number of the women feel strongly that if the purse inspections are to continue, then men's inner coat pockets should also be subjected to a visual inspection. If the inspection program is a serious one, it should be clear that a man's inner coat pockets serve the same function as a woman's purse and can conceal documents. The recent revelation in the press that Kampiles smuggled out highly sensitive documents in his inner coat pockets should demand that the men's pockets be inspected. To our knowledge, there is no case of a woman employee concealing documents in her purse. (U/IUO)

6. Because of the interest and emotion generated by this problem, the Board fears that if some corrective action is not considered, there is the very real possibility that a disgruntled and aggrieved woman employee will 1) go to the press; 2) file an EEO complaint; or 3) file a lawsuit, claiming a violation of EEO laws or Constitutional rights. (U/IUO)

7. Recommendation:

(a) That the Security Inspection Program be modeled on the National Security Agency's inspection program in which only briefcases and packages are inspected. (U/IUO)

(b) That alternatively, if the inspection of women's purses is to continue, then there should be an inspection of men's inner coat pockets. (U/IUO)

(c) That because of the inconsistent administration of the inspection program by the FPO's, the FPO guidelines describing the scope of the searches under the program be distributed to every employee and posted at each entrance. (U/IUO)

(d) That employees be instructed that any alleged infractions of the guidelines are to be reported to the Director of Security. (U/IUO)

STATINTL

151  
[REDACTED]  
for the Federal Women's  
Program Board

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

Distribution:

Original - Addressee      1-OLC Subject

1-OS (Cambino)            1-OLC Chrono

1-DDA (Blake)

1-DCI

1-DDCI

1-ER

OLC:YTF:mlg (14 Dec 1978)

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

DDA Registry  
78-319/17

Executive Registry  
78-2534/17

27 September 1978

OK -  
I suggest a less  
formal Director's  
note -

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Security Inspection Program

25X1A

25X1A

1. Per your instructions I held a discussion on the security inspection program at the staff meeting on 25 September. Opposition to the program (mainly [REDACTED] and Zeke Zellmer) was based on its implied mistrust of employees. After some discussion I think some of the concerns of those opposed were satisfied. [REDACTED] and Zeke Zellmer (and probably Bob Bowie, but he never did pronounce himself) will probably still opt against the program if given a choice. I announced that I would recommend to you that we go ahead. They did not choose to exercise their right to dissent.

2. I indicated that my recommendation would be accompanied by two caveats:

a. We give the guards a thorough training program.  
Mr. Blake is gearing up to do this.

b. We write all employees a letter from you in an effort to enlist their understanding, a draft of such a letter is attached. I had in mind a somewhat more informal style, but I think the attached is adequate.

3. If you agree I suggest we set 9 October as the date to initiate the program.

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Frank Carlucci

Attachment

E-2 IMPDET  
CL BY 40871

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

CONFIDENTIAL

DDA 78-3019/6

22 September 1978

78-2534/13

DDA Registry

Security

NOTED BY DCI  
28 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration

Stan:

1. It appears that we may have misunderstood your last request for information concerning the reaction of the Deputies to the possibility of a continuing bag-search program. The following information represents what I now understand your desires to be. All six of the DCI and CIA Deputies understand the mechanics of the proposal. While I have endeavored to develop a unanimity of opinion to proceed as a policy matter, I have not met with success. I would describe the positions of the six individuals as follows:

a. DDA, DDO, and [REDACTED] vote "yes" to proceed to initiate the program.

b. Bob Bowie votes a "qualified no;" by that he means he is disinclined to say yes, but would like to have a discussion at a 9:00 a.m. meeting on the matter and is willing to approach such a discussion with an open mind.

c. [REDACTED] and Dirks vote "no."

2. It is my further understanding you wanted assurance that all NFIB Principals have had the mechanics of the program called to their attention so that they understand how it will operate. This has been accomplished and none have asked that you not proceed.

3. I trust the above represents the responsiveness to your desires.

John F. Blake

Distribution:

Orig - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - D/Sec  
1 - DDA

DCI/IC 78-4717

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Collection Tasking Staff

DD/A Registry  
78-3019/3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Jack Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration

DD/A Registry  
File Security

STATINTL

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

SUBJECT: Additional Security Measures

1. Confirming our discussion of proposed additional security measures yesterday, I consider it important to preserve, and not weaken, individual motivation toward necessary security measures. To this end I suggest:

a. Continue spot-checking briefcases (with emphasis on proper double-wrap/inventory procedures) but not 100% check which could undermine employee motivation as sign of lack of confidence.

b. When inventory required of documents in briefcase, let carrier prepare and sign, leaving carbon at office. Requiring designated person to sign could be counterproductive if perceived as another demotivating case of no confidence.

c. Avoid checking women's purses too small to hold 8 1/2 x 11 documents - otherwise this could engender embarrassing EEO complaints.

d. Randomly check inventories of TS documents on a continuing basis.

2. I believe above checks can create necessary increased attention and care for classified documents without unduly weakening feeling of confidence in employees and the related prime importance of personal responsibility.

STATINTL



~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

DD/A Registry

78-3019/5

DD/A Registry  
Security

20 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security  
SUBJECT: Procedures for Searching Employees' Briefcases

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.

2. Background: In response to your memorandum of 14 September 1978 concerning the application of, and controls for, the briefcase inspection for NFIB meetings and other high-level visitors to the Community Headquarters Building, the following procedures have already been established:

a. NFIB principals and their alternates who hold the blue Intelligence Community staff badge will have a "C" indicator on the badge which permits them to exit the CHB without having the contents of hand-carried items inspected.

b. Other Community groups whose clearances have been certified and who will be attending special conferences in the CHB will be issued "Conference Only" badges which will permit them to exit without being inspected.

c. An appropriate number of Component Document Control Officers (CDCOs) have been identified by their respective components within the CHB, and they have been issued CDCO

OS 8 2542/A

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

documentation. These people are authorized to transport classified material without being subject to inspection. The CDCOs have in their possession the form with which to grant other individuals temporary authorization to transport classified material from the CHB.

These procedures will enable high-level visitors with classified material in their possession to expeditiously exit the CHB while still maintaining improved security controls.



*[Signature]* Robert W. Gambino

STATINTL

Distribution:  
Orig - Adse  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
① - DD/A

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7



Executive Registry
78-2534/6

DD/A Registry
78-3019/4

14 September 1978

DD/A Registry  
File Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Security

1. Yesterday at the NFIB Principals' meeting, I briefly discussed our plans to begin searching employees' briefcases. I pointed out that this move was motivated not by the Kampiles case but as a result of the fact that during spot searches and repolygraphing we had discovered that many employees were taking classified documents out of the building in order to work on them at home.

2. Bobby Inman summarized the procedures which for years have been in effect at NSA. He stated that of the [REDACTED] employees there, some 1000 or so have special passes or badges which permit them to go past the Marine guards without being searched. In addition, NSA has 28 special badges which are given to visitors from other agencies so they can come and go on official business without the inconvenience of being searched. As for the purse problem, Bobby stated that large purses are subject to search, small ones are not.

STATINTL

3. There was some concern expressed among the group about how controls would be handled [REDACTED] at NFIB meetings, etc. I assured them that we would try to work out a system which would allow high-level visitors from other Agencies to move in and out expeditiously. Please address this problem and let me know how you intend to handle it.

STATINTL

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY~~  
~~WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505~~

#31

~~MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EMPLOYEES~~

SUBJECT: Security Inspection Program

REFERENCE: [REDACTED] dated 5 September 1978;  
~~Same Subject~~

STATINTL

1. I should like to convey to you directly some thoughts relating to my decision to initiate an inspection program involving all briefcases, handbags, packages and other material being removed from Agency buildings in the Headquarters area. This new program will serve to improve our handling and protection of classified material, especially by inhibiting its unauthorized removal from Agency buildings.

2. Originally I had hoped to initiate the program on 11 September 1978. Because of the seriousness of this issue, I delayed implementation to permit further study and extensive discussions on the merits of the action. Based on the results, I have reaffirmed my decision and will institute the program on 10 October 1978.

3. I am confident that the vast majority of Agency employees, who represent the best that this country has to offer, take their security responsibility seriously and do not remove classified documents from Agency premises unless authorized to do so. Unfortunately, evidence over the past year reveals that a number of our employees are taking classified, often acutely sensitive, materials from the office. In most cases, such removal has been for the purpose of using the material at home in an effort to get the job done, *Commendable - But the risks are too great for us to condone this.*

4. ~~I view this situation with considerable alarm.~~ No matter how well-intentioned the removal of classified material may be, the risk of exposure or compromise is too great to be permitted at all. In view of my responsibility to protect such information, a lack of action on my part would be inexcusable.

5. I ask the understanding, cooperation and support of each of you in seeing that this program is successful. While there may be, from time to time, minor inconveniences, it is a small price to pay when weighed against the important responsibility we all have to safeguard our Nation's vital information.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT: Security Inspection Program

REFERENCE: Headquarters [REDACTED] dated  
5 September 1978, same subject

STATINTL

1. In referenced notice I announced and requested your cooperation in the initiation of an inspection program involving all briefcases, handbags, packages and other materials being removed from Agency buildings in the Headquarters area. I pointed out that I had decided, after much thought, that this new program was necessary to improve our handling and protection of classified materials, especially by inhibiting its unauthorized removal from Agency buildings.

2. Originally this program was to begin on 11 September 1978. Because of the seriousness of this issue, I delayed implementation to permit further study and extensive discussions on the merits of the program. Based on the results of these studies and discussions, I have reaffirmed my earlier decision and am now prepared to institute the program on October 1978.

3. I do want to convey to you directly not only my decision on this matter but also the elements that have contributed to this decision.

4. I am confident that the Agency has a well-refined applicant selection and security adjudication system. I firmly believe that we hire only the best that the country has to offer. The 31-year history of the Agency, in conducting its affairs in a responsible and secure fashion, proves this point. I am equally aware that the vast majority of Agency employees take their security responsibilities seriously and are never involved in the unauthorized removal of classified documents from Agency premises.

5. Unfortunately, however, evidence has mounted over the past year that a significant portion of our population, albeit small and mostly without nefarious intentions, is regularly taking classified, in many cases acutely sensitive, materials from the office. In most cases, such removal has been for the purpose of working at home with the material in an effort to get the job done.

6. I view this situation with very great concern because I feel, however well-intentioned the removal of classified material in these instances may be, the sensitive information involved is being exposed to a very great and unnecessary risk of compromise. In view of my responsibility to protect such information a lack of action on my part would be inexcusable.

7. I understand completely that regulations and procedures accomplish their purpose only if everyone loyally and completely supports them. In the spirit of that observation, I ask each of you to understand what is involved and to cooperate fully in our resolve to enhance the overall security posture of the Agency. While there may be, from time to time, minor inconveniences in carrying out this program, it is a small price to pay with reference to the great responsibility we all have to safeguard our nation's vital information.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

STATINTL

SECURITY

5 September 1978

### SECURITY INSPECTION PROGRAM

1. I would like to enlist your cooperation in a new security procedure which, after much thought, I have decided is necessary in order to effect better handling and transport of classified material. Starting on 11 September 1978, the Federal Protective Officers (FPO's) who protect our buildings will initiate a 24-hour-a-day briefcase, handbag and package inspection program. Virtually all personnel departing Agency buildings will be required to open these items for inspection by the FPO's. The only exceptions will be personnel who are official and documented couriers, personnel designated and documented as Component Document Control Officers (CDCO's), and, finally, personnel issued temporary authorization and documentation by their CDCO's permitting them to transport classified material. The identification and briefing of CDCO's is now underway.

2. Any unauthorized attempt to remove classified material from an Agency building will be reported by the FPO's to the Office of Security for investigation and appropriate action.

3. The following notice will be conspicuously posted at every entrance to our buildings:

"Unauthorized removal of classified documents from this building is prohibited. All packages, briefcases, handbags, and other containers brought into, while on, or being removed from the property are subject to inspection. Entry of this facility beyond the Federal Protective Officer stations signifies your consent to such inspections."

4. I realize that some delays in exiting our buildings will occur, particularly during the first few days of this program. Your cooperation will be necessary to make the new procedure work smoothly. Delays can be minimized by reducing the carrying of briefcases and packages to an absolute minimum. In those cases where their use is found necessary, they should be open and ready for inspection prior to confronting the FPO. I appreciate your help.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

STATINTL

*Mr. Blaker input* SEP 1970

I have had under consideration for some period of time the initiation of a new security procedure. The procedure would call for the Federal Protective Officers, under the overall guidance of our Office of Security to inspect briefcases, large bags, etc., carried by our employees when leaving our buildings to ensure that there is no classified material present. While we have for some period of time conducted "spot checks" for the same purpose, I realize that doing this on a continuing basis may meet with less than universal support of all our employees.

Because of the seriousness of this matter, I have delayed implementation so that extensive discussions on the merits of the case could be held. I am now prepared, based on the results of these discussions, to have this procedure commence on \_\_\_\_\_ (date).

I did want to communicate directly to you my decision on this matter and, further, have an opportunity to establish several points. The key ingredient in our security policy has been and remains the integrity of our people. We believe we have a well-refined applicant selection system and further believe we hire only the best that the country has to offer. The thirty-one year history of this Agency to conduct its affairs in a secure and responsible fashion prove this point. At the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that from time to time people without authorization remove classified material from the building. This is a

serious matter and I do have a legal responsibility to take every reasonable step to preclude it from happening. Edicts and procedures alone, however, accomplish their purpose only if we all loyally and completely support their purpose. In the spirit of that observation I ask each of you to understand what is involved and to please fully cooperate in the spirit of the matter. While there may be from time to time minor inconveniences for a few individuals, it is the small price we all must pay because of the great responsibility we all hold to safeguard our nation's vital information.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

78-2534/19

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Security Inspection Program

FROM:

John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration  
7D 24 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DDA 78-3019/6

DATE

2 October 1978 STATINTL

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

Director of Central Intelligence  
7D 5607 Hqs

2 OCT 1978

Stan:

We have rewritten and "loosened up" the paper on the bag inspection.

3.

DCI

10/3

You appended the following comment in sending it back "I suggest a less formal Director's note." Your choice "note" leads me to raise the question as to whether you want this message to go out in the format in which it is presented or whether you would rather see it go out in a special "Notes from the Director." May I have your pleasure.

4.

EO/ODA

10/3

5.

Reg-file

6.

MEMO BULLETIN -  
NOTES

7.

8.

9.

John F. Blake

Atts

10.

Distribution:

Orig RS - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DDA

STATINTL

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080004-7

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DD/A Registry  
File Security

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposed Memorandum on the Security Inspection Program

FROM:

Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security  
4E-60, Hdqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

27 SEP 1978

STATINTL

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. DDA  
7D-24, Hdqs.

*[Handwritten initials]*

Attached is our proposal for a memorandum for all employees which the DCI would issue on the package checks. I have also attached your earlier draft.

*[Handwritten checkmark]*

Robert W. Gambino

OS 8 2660